# Governance > Keeping humans at the policy layer: protecting the registry, the > escape-to-improvement loop, and what Bastion deliberately does not guarantee. Bastion relocates the human from reviewing diffs to *governing the reviewers*. That only works if the reviewer policy itself is protected and continuously improved. This chapter is the human's operating manual. ## The policy layer The reviewers, their prompts, and their triggers *are* the review policy. The whole safety story rests on a simple rule: **any change to that policy is reviewed by a human before it merges.** Otherwise an aligned-but-mistaken agent could quietly loosen a trigger or soften a prompt, and the gate would erode without anyone noticing. Two native GitHub mechanisms enforce this; neither is exotic. ### CODEOWNERS protects the registry Bastion can generate a CODEOWNERS block covering the reviewer-policy paths: the registry, the reviewer definitions, the Bastion workflow, and the CODEOWNERS file itself: ```sh bastion github codeowners --owner @your-org/platform ``` Pass `--owner` once per owner (it is repeatable). Add the generated block to your `CODEOWNERS`. With that block in place, any PR that adds, removes, or edits a reviewer; loosens a trigger; or changes a prompt touches an owned path, so GitHub requires a human review before merge. You can also write your own CODEOWNERS instead; the generated block is a correct starting suggestion. > Why generate it statically rather than have Bastion manage it live? CODEOWNERS > changes only take effect *after* a PR merges, so the file must be written to > protect every path Bastion will ever write into, ahead of time, which is what > the generated, reviewed block provides. ### Branch protection requires the check Require Bastion's review on your default branch. That is the review job from [Continuous integration](./continuous-integration.md#the-workflow), which also posts the always-present aggregate check named `bastion` (with a check run per reviewer alongside it), so you can require either the job or that `bastion` check. A PR then cannot merge with the gate switched off, and because the workflow file and the registry are themselves owned paths, switching it off is itself a policy change a human sees. That is the entire enforcement story, and it is intentionally modest. The contributor Bastion is designed for is an aligned agent that would never quietly disable CI; the CODEOWNERS trip wire and the required check exist so that *if* policy changes, a human is in the loop, not so that a determined adversary is stopped. ## The escape-to-improvement loop An **escape** is a PR that merged but should have been blocked: a reviewer missed something. Escapes are inevitable, especially early while reviewers are still being tuned, and they are the single most valuable signal for improving the system. Bastion cannot detect escapes itself: if it could, it would have blocked them. This is a human governance loop: 1. **Notice** an escape (monitoring, a bug report, a production incident). 2. **Triage** it: which reviewer(s) should have caught it, and why did they not? 3. **Improve** the policy: sharpen a prompt, add a new single-concern reviewer for the missed property, or fix the reviewer's environment. 4. **Merge** the policy change (through the CODEOWNERS-gated human review above). This is why Bastion expects reviewers to improve over time. Start with a reviewer that is good enough and sharpen it from real escapes instead of perfecting it on paper. Treat escapes as expected feedback rather than failures, and triage them regularly so the policy keeps improving. ## What Bastion does not guarantee Govern with these limits in mind; they are deliberate, not gaps to be closed: - **It is not a correctness proof.** Bastion does not guarantee code is free of bugs or vulnerabilities. A reviewer is only as good as its model and prompt; it is code review without the human in the small loop, not a verifier. - **It does not judge whether the right thing is being built.** That is a design-time question; by PR time the ship has sailed. Keep humans in the design loop. - **It is not an adversarial security boundary.** Bastion assumes PR authors are aligned contributors and treats reviewed code as trusted input; it does not defend reviewer agents against prompt injection or exfiltration from the code they review. The bar is *reasonable reduction proportionate to effort*: a speed bump and good defaults, like lint and CI and human review before it. Anything stronger (signing, external rule storage, an enumerated trusted-computing-base) is deliberately out of scope. These limits follow from one assumption: the threat being managed is an aligned-but-fallible agent, not a determined adversary. Govern accordingly. Bastion is a control on honest mistakes and drift, layered with the rest of your CI, not a boundary that holds against someone actively trying to defeat it. ## A governance checklist For a healthy deployment: - [ ] `.bastion.yaml` and the Bastion workflow are CODEOWNERS-protected. - [ ] Bastion's review is required by branch protection on the default branch (the review job, or the aggregate `bastion` check that `bastion github report` posts). - [ ] Reviewer-policy PRs get a real human review, not a rubber stamp. - [ ] Someone owns escape triage, and escapes feed back into reviewer changes. - [ ] Billing is configured (per-author secrets or an API-key fallback) so reviews are not silently blocked by missing credentials. See [Continuous integration](./continuous-integration.md#authentication--billing). --- That is the guide. If you want to work on Bastion itself rather than use it, the design notes and contributor docs live in the [Bastion repository](https://github.com/jssblck/bastion).